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Economic background 
The world economy weakened towards the end of 2002 and 
at the start of 2003. Geopolitical tensions and substantial 
falls in equity markets were the two main sources of 
concern. Economic per formance for 2002 is significantly 
poorer than most economic commentators estimated. The 
situation in Iraq now appears to be more certain. While 
conflict is never a sought after outcome (if there is a short 
and clearly resolved conflict) then it will clear most of the 
uncertainty that has persisted in world markets. There are 
signs of recovery in the US and some emerging signs of 
recover y in the Euro Area. Germany is a drag on Euro Area 
growth in the short-run. Japan remains weak but at least it 
is improving. There also appears to be a firm commitment 
by the Japanese government to eliminating non-per forming 
loans (NPLs). Global inflationary pressures are relatively 
muted. The outlook for world growth is promising. The 
recovery is likely to boost world trade and strengthens 
domestic demand. 
 
The situation in Iraq makes forecasting the economy more 
problematic. We do not try to model world outcomes but 
have to take a view as to how any conflict in Iraq may 
unfold. We have followed the work of Cordesman (2003) 
who sets out three scenarios for a war in Iraq. The full set 
of assumptions of these scenarios and the outcome for oil 
prices (see Ebel, Franssen, Goldstein and Sieminski (2002)) 
is given in Appendix 1. Our main forecast assumes that the 
benign scenario of a rapid and decisive victory for the Allies 
prevails. This also entails no significant disruption to oil 
supplies, no use of weapons of mass destruction or 
increased escalation outside the theatre of operation and 
also assumes that there is no significant terrorism activity 
in the US or Europe. We have also taken into account any 
effects on the UK, as outlined by Barrell and Holland 
(2003). While assuming an outcome that has little effect on 
GDP it should be noted that the intermediate and worst 
scenarios have significant implications for the world, UK 
and Scottish economies and cannot be ignored. For this 
reason we have provided a forecast for each of these 
scenarios. 
 
The UK economy remains one of the best performing 
countries in the OECD. Growth for 2002 was only 1.6 per 
cent but it is forecast to be 2.2 per cent in 2003 and 2.4 
per cent in the following year. The labour market has 
remained relatively strong during this period despite some 
considerable job losses and contractions in output. Unem- 
ployment is low and is forecast to remain low. Inflationary 
pressures are modest with only strong house price inflation 
(which is expected to slow gradually) and oil prices (believed 
to be a temporary pressure due to the Iraq crisis) having 
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any significant effects. The MPC cut rates to 3.75 per cent 
in order to help manufacturers believing perhaps that 
inflationary pressures may not be as strong as some 
suggest. Consumption and government spending are 
significant drivers of real GDP growth and investment is 
forecast to pick up in the future. 
 
In Scotland economic growth for 2002 is forecast to be 
par ticularly weak. Consumption and government spending 
are still the key drivers of domestic demand. Tourism 
activity is low especially the expenditure of foreign visitors. 
Expor ts both to the UK but more significantly to the rest of 
the world have fallen sharply. This has been a vital factor in 
the poor growth per formance of the economy. 
 
The outlook for the world, the UK and the Scottish economy 
remains promising despite 2002. Recovery is forecast for 
the latter half of 2003 and is expected to have a firm hold 
by 2004. Manufacturing is also likely to recover in 2004 
with low interest rates, modest inflation and relative 
macroeconomic stability and significant stimuli to both 
domestic and external demand. 
 
 
The forecast in detail 
 
GDP 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for the Scottish economy. 
There have been several revisions to the Scottish Executive 
index for GDP in the last quar ter. We present our forecasts 
for GDP and broad sectoral output in Table 1 for the period 
2002 to 2004. We have revised our forecast for GDP 
growth down significantly for 2002. The unanticipated 
events in the latter part of the year have had a more 
serious impact on economic growth than most forecasters 
believed possible. Consequently we are forecasting that the 
Scottish economy will contract by 0.2 per cent in 2002 and 
grow by 1.1 per cent in 2003. Growth is forecast to return 
close to trend by 2004. In the short-run the outlook for the 
Scottish economy is weak but in the medium-run it is more 
promising. The forecast for 2003 is down slightly on the 
previous quar ter but we still believe that some of the 
economic activity from 2003 will be delayed into 2004 thus 
boosting growth in that year. 
 
 
Table 1: Main forecasts of the Scottish economy, 2002-2004 
 
2002 2003 2004 
 
GDP                                                     -0.2%         1.1%         1.8% 
Agriculture                                                         -2.5%       -4.3%       -3.0% 
Manufacturing                                              -13.2%       -1.7%         1.8% 
Manufacturing (ex Electronics)                  -6.0%       -3.0%         1.4% 
Construction                                                    -5.1%         2.0%         3.1% 
Services                                                             3.9%        2.0%         1.8% 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, March 2003 
Output 
Agriculture is forecast to decline by 2.5 per cent in 2002 
and by 4.3 per cent in 2003. In 2004 the decrease is 
forecast to be 3.0 per cent. A significant part of this is 
explained by the shrinking of the fishing fleet and the 
consequent knock-on effects for some of the on-shore jobs 
related to fishing. Agriculture itself is also forecast to face 
some difficult times ahead. 
 
The manufacturing sector has remained weak in 2002 with 
fur ther significant falls in output over the latest four 
quar ters on the preceding four quarters principally from: 
 
Æ    electronics (-28.0 per cent); 
Æ    transport equipment (-24.5 per cent); 
Æ    textiles (-8.8 per cent) and 
Æ    paper, printing and publishing (-6.0 per cent). 
 
Recover y in the sector is not forecast until 2004 with 
growth of 1.8 per cent. The sector is forecast to decline by 
13.2 per cent in 2002 and by 1.7 per cent in 2003. The 
recover y in manufacturing is important to increase produc- 
tivity and to stem the loss of skilled workers as manufactur- 
ing job losses have continued throughout 2002. As dis- 
cussed in the UK economy, we are probably observing a 
shift in comparative advantage and displacement is not 
confined to Scotland. It is preferable to have a gradual, 
albeit painful adjustment rather than a sudden but severe 
collapse of a particular sector. 
 
Services are forecast to grow by 3.9 per cent in 2002, by 
2.0 per cent in 2003 and by 1.8 per cent in 2004. The 
annual change of the third quarter data from the Scottish 
Executive indicate that transport, storage and communica- 
tions (9.6 per cent) and real estate and business services 
(9.8 per cent) are the main drivers of Scottish services at 
this point in time. Communications and banking have 
significantly stronger growth performances at 16.3 per cent 
and 15.0 per cent respectively. Tourism is not forecast to 
do well until 2004 and this is unchanged from our previous 
forecast. 
 
Construction is now forecast to contract by 5.1% in 2002 
compared to 1.1 per cent in the previous quar ter. While 
house price inflation is quite strong 52 per cent of new UK 
lending is for re-mortgaging. Both commercial and indus- 
trial properties are likely to increase activity in 2003 and 
2004. Growth is forecast to be 3.1 per cent in 2004. 
 
 
Employment 
We present our forecasts of employment in Table 2 with the 
net employment change figure in brackets. The employment 
figures are calibrated on the employers quarterly survey 
series as given in Table B.16 in Labour Market Trends, 
National Statistics. Our forecast for employment change in 
2002 in the previous quar ter was finely balanced and 
suggested a job gain of 1,000 for 2002. Following the 
significant adverse effects on output the employment 
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forecast for 2002 is now 2,185,400 or a net decrease of 
17,000 jobs. The forecast for change in manufacturing 
remains the same with a net loss of 16,500 jobs but it is 
the service sector that is forecast not to create as many 
jobs as we had forecast in the previous forecast. In the 
previous quar ter we forecast a net job gain of 23,900 for 
services but this has been revised down considerably to 
1,720,500 or a net job gain of only 4,400. For all employ- 
ment we forecast that 19,200 jobs will be created in 2003 
and a further 31,200 jobs in 2004. Both of these figures 
have been revised downwards from the forecast in the 
previous quarter reflecting the slowing of growth and a slow 
but steady recovery. Employment is forecast to be 
2,235,800 in 2004. 
 
Manufacturing employment is forecast to be 273,00 in 
2002 falling to 268,900 in 2003 before increasing to 
274,200 in 2004.Over 2002 and 2003 manufacturing is 
forecast to lose 20,600 jobs and only to have a net gain of 
5,300 in 2004. Some of the worst hit sectors include 
electronics, textiles and transport equipment. 
 
Employment in construction is forecast to contract by 4,300 
in 2002 to 120,700. Employment is forecast to rise steadily 
in 2003 and 2004 to 126,600 in 2004. Agricultural 
employment is forecast to decline over the forecast period 
from 34,300 in 2002 to 32,000 in 2004. The job losses 
are mainly in fishing but a significant proportion are in 
agriculture itself. 
 
 
Table 2: Forecasts of Scottish employment and net 
employment change, 2002-2004 
 
2002 2003 2004 
 
Total Employment (000s)  2,185.4 2,204.6 2,235.8 
(-17,000)  (19,200)    
(31,200) 
 
Agriculture  34.3  32.9  32.0 
(-200) (-1,400) (-1,000) 
 
Manufacturing  273.0  268.9  274.2 
(-16,500) (-4,100) (5,300) 
 
Construction  120.7  122.8  126.6 
(-4,300) (2,200) (3,800) 
 
Services 1,720.5 1,744.3 1,765.7 
(4,400)  (23,800)  (21,400) 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, March 2003 
Unemployment 
We present our forecasts of unemployment in Table 3. Both 
the ILO measure and claimant count measure are given. 
The preferred measure of unemployment however is ILO 
unemployment as given by the LFS. The forecast for ILO 
unemployment is 164,300 (6.3 per cent) in 2002 and 
162,200 in 2003 (6.2 per cent).  Claimant count continues 
to remain at low levels and is forecast to be 101,900 (4.0 
per cent) in 2002, 95,400 (3.7 per cent) in 2003 and 
96,300 (3.7 per cent) in 2004. The labour market has 
performed relatively well during the downturn and we 
expect this to continue. 
 
 
Table 3: Forecasts of Scottish unemployment, 2002-2004 
 
2002 2003 2004 
 
ILO Unemployment (levels 164,300  162,200 157,200 
Rate 6.3% 6.2% 5.9% 
 
Claimant Count (levels) 101,900 95,400 96,300 
Rate 4.0% 3.7% 3.7% 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, March 2003 
 
 
 
The Scottish forecasts contained in Tables 1 to 3 above are 
in keeping with recent economic developments in the world, 
UK and Scottish economies and the model maintains 
consistency within the forecast. The forecasts suggest that 
the Scottish economy despite its poor economic perform- 
ance in 2002 will slowly recover in the second part of 2003 
and is likely to experience firm recovery in 2004 when 
manufacturing output is forecast to be positive. The 
reduction in economic activity in 2002 and the early part of 
2003 does suggest that this activity will be postponed until 
later in the forecast period and not foregone. Recover y is 
likely to boost world trade and domestic demand, further 
strengthening production of goods and services. There are 
of course risks to the Scottish economy but they have been 
discussed in the world economy and the UK economy. 
 
 
Alternative forecasts of the possible impacts of 
war in Iraq 
The aim of this section is to assess some possible eco- 
nomic impacts on Scotland arising from conflict with Iraq. 
We assume that the UK is directly involved with the military 
action as the lead partner to a US led assault. The UK is 
also assumed to participate with the UN in Iraq following 
the cessation of hostilities in a humanitarian role. It is the 
former situation that most of the impacts are derived from. 
The economic impacts are assessed in terms of GDP, 
sectoral output, employment and unemployment. There is 
also a discussion of other relevant macroeconomic vari- 
ables at the UK level. 
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The main channels of transmission of adverse effects from 
the situation in Iraq to the world economy include; 
 
Æ    oil prices (increases inflationar y pressures); 
Æ    exchange rates; 
Æ    equity markets (affected by uncertainty and psychologi- 
cal effects) 
Æ    psychological effects (consumer and business senti- 
ment, tourism, etc.) and 
Æ    global economic conditions (effects on domestic and 
external demand). 
 
In determining our forecasts we have used three principle 
channels; 
 
Æ    consumption (reflecting psychological effects and 
global economic conditions); 
Æ    tourism (also reflecting psychological effects) and 
Æ    exports (representing oil price effects). 
 
We have not included exchange rate effects or equity 
markets. Nordhaus (2002) and House Budget Democratic 
Staff (2002) demonstrate that using the costs of the 1991 
Gulf War are a relatively good proxy for what the current 
conflict might cost. The Department of Culture Media and 
Spor t used the 1991 Gulf War to estimate the economic 
impact of lost tourists and calculated a reduction of 22 per 
cent for US visitors to the UK. We use the decrease in 
visitor numbers as a proxy for how visitor numbers to 
Scotland may fall following this conflict. The data from 
VisitScotland demonstrates that the decrease in visitor 
numbers following the 1998 East Asian crisis was 7 per 
cent. This is close to the total loss. 
 
For the intermediate scenario the vector of final demand is 
reduced by 7.0 per cent in 2003 and by half that in 2004 in 
order to simulate a drop in international visitor numbers. 
Expor ts are reduced by 0.4 per cent in 2003 and by 0.2 per 
cent in 2004 as oil prices return to normal following an 
increase that is sustained for a year. We have assumed that 
oil prices settle at $20-25 per barrel following 2004. 
Consumption is reduced by only 0.1 percentage point in 
both 2003 and 2004 in the intermediate scenario. 
 
In the worst scenario tourism is reduced by 7.0 per cent in 
both 2003 and 2004 (this was the outcome following the 
East Asian Crisis). Exports are decreased by 0.8 percentage 
points in 2003 and by 1.6 percentage points in 2004 in 
order to tr y to stimulate the effect of a sustained high oil 
price over two years. In 2003 consumption is reduced by 
only 0.2 percentage points and by 0.4 percentage points in 
2004, as consumers would contract spending significantly 
given these economic conditions. 
 
We have set out our alternative forecasts for the Scottish 
economy in Table 4 using the intermediate and worst 
scenarios. I have not included a „no-war‟ scenario as this is 
not now possible but prior to the conflict this scenario 
indicated that GDP would be slightly lower in 2003 when 
compared to the benign scenario. 
 
 
Table 4: Alternative forecasts of the Scottish economy, 2003- 
2004 
 
Benign Scenario 2003 2004 
 
GDP                                                                 1.1%                1.8% 
Manufacturing                                                             -1.7%                1.7% 
Services                                                                          2.0%                1.8% 
Employment                                                             19,200            31,200 
Unemployment 6.2% 5.9% 
Claimant Count 3.7% 3.7% 
 
Intermediate Scenario 2003 2004 
 
GDP                                                                0.8%                1.6% 
Manufacturing                                                             -2.0%                2.1% 
Services                                                                          1.7%                1.6% 
Employment                                                             16,900            19,400 
Unemployment 6.3% 6.2% 
Claimant Count 3.9% 3.8% 
 
Worst Scenario 2003 2004 
 
GDP -0.2% 0.2% 
Manufacturing -2.0%  -5.8 
Services  0.1%  1.6% 
Employment -8,000 -2,500 
Unemployment 6.6% 6.9% 
Claimant Count 4.0% 4.3% 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, March 2003 
 
 
 
We can see that following conflict in Iraq the economy in 
each of the scenarios takes some time to adjust and in 
particular moving from the benign to the intermediate 
scenario does not alter the forecasts significantly in 2003. 
In the intermediate scenario this is not the case in 2004 
when it is clear that the main economic casualty is employ- 
ment growth. Given that tourism demand has had a 
significant reduction this is not entirely surprising. Unem- 
ployment is forecast to fall slightly more slowly. The main 
channel of transmission here is psychological effects with 
exchange rates, oil prices and equity markets playing a 
secondary role. 
 
The worst scenario does bring about clear changes immedi- 
ately with GDP forecast to contract by 0.2 per cent and 
services output growth only marginal at 0.1 per cent. There 
are significant job losses in 2003 with unemployment 
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forecast to rise to 6.6 per cent. In 2004 there are further 
job losses forecast with unemployment forecast to reach 
6.9 per cent. Claimant count is forecast to be 4.3 per cent 
in 2004. Real GDP growth is forecast to be only 0.2 per 
cent. This scenario has substantial global impacts and 
would probably result in a global recession. The main 
problem for the world economy in this scenario is a high 
and sustained oil price and while other factors play a 
secondar y role their impact will be much greater than in the 
intermediate scenario. This scenario would according to 
Meyer (2002 and 2003) lead to a global recession. 
 
Comparisons with UK and world forecasts 
We do not attempt to forecast the world or the UK economy 
but there are a number of reputable forecasts that indicate 
a similar impact on these economies. It is useful to exam- 
ine these to assess the context of the Scottish forecasts. 
Table 5 present forecasts for the US and UK economies. 
The focus is on GDP. 
 
 
Table 5: Forecasts of the US and UK Economies, 2003-2004 
 
Benign Intermediate Worst 
UK forecast 03 04 03 04 03 04 
 
NIESR 2.2% 2.4% n/a n/a 
OEF 2.4% 3.2% 1.2% 3.3%  -0.4% 2.7% 
RBS 2.4% 3.6% 2.2% 2.6%  -0.1% 1.6% 
 
US forecast 03 04 03 04 03 04 
 
NIESR 2.6% 3.1% n/a n/a 
OEF 2.7% 3.6% 1.3% 3.4%  -0.6% 2.0% 
RBS 2.4% 3.5%   n/a  n/a 
 
 
 
Source: NIESR, Barrell and Holland (2003),  OEF, Britton, E (2003)  and RBS, 
O Carroll (2003) 
 
 
The NIESR do not make forecasts for war scenarios simply 
because the possibilities are so many, the interactions 
complex and the almost endless possible outcomes are 
likely to have significant errors1. As the NIESR commentary 
indicates many of the adverse impacts have already taken 
place, specifically psychological effects, oil price effects, 
exchange rate effects and equity market effects. Why do 
others do this if this is the case? The value of these 
forecasts are that they are indicative of what might happen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Note: Some commentators suggest that forecasts of this kind may 
have errors of 50 per cent or more associated with them. 
and should not be taken as quantitative outcomes with a 
given amount of certainty. The Bank of England (Bank of 
England (2003) pp48-49), does not under take war scenario 
forecasts but gives clear indications about the implications 
for the economy of any adverse impacts. It was Keynes who 
said; 
 
“It is better to be vaguely right rather than precisely 
wrong.” 
 
 
The opportunity costs of war 
Again the work of other respected institutions and commen- 
tators point towards the possible costs of war. War involves 
the use of scarce resources that could be put to alternative 
uses (see Har tley (2002)). Furthermore the direct costs of 
military action are not the only costs although the UK has 
only set aside £1 billion for the war against terror, H. M. 
Treasury (2002), p.3. There will be peacekeeping, humani- 
tarian aid and re-building costs. This will entail increased 
government expenditure over a much longer time period 
than the duration of the conflict. Governments despite the 
experience of previous conflicts and timely high quality 
economic advice often either ignore or under-estimate the 
economic costs of war (see Nordhaus (2002)). The decision 
to engage in conflict is a political one and the economic 
consequences are secondary. It is outwith the scope of this 
article to investigate the costs of conflict but it necessary to 
indicate that given our previous experience the opportunity 
cost of war will be much higher than estimated and that 
these resources have an alternative use. 
 
 
Conclusions 
It is clear from the large body of work surrounding the 
conflict in Iraq that a rapid and decisive victory for the 
Allies is the best economic outcome. Indeed when com- 
pared to the no war scenario GDP actually rises in 2003. 
While there are significant unknown factors and an almost 
endless series of combinations of outcomes it is clear that 
a prolonged conflict with significant adverse outcomes is 
more likely to have a substantial negative impact on the 
world economy. The main factors that are significant 
causes for concern are psychological effects, oil prices, 
equity markets and exchange rates. We cannot emphasise 
enough that the danger of a global recession while having a 
small probability cannot be ignored. The long-term cost of 
the conflict is also likely to be high with considerable costs 
after the cessation of hostilities and that these resources 
have an alternative use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenneth Low 
21 March 2003 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Benign Scenario (40-60 per cent probability and 
conflict of 4 to 6 weeks) 
Æ    regime collapse; 
Æ    major urban conflict in only a few areas; 
Æ    limited civilian deaths and collateral damage; 
Æ    no significant use of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD); 
Æ    no reduction in oil production or exports by OPEC; 
Æ    Saudi Arabia increases oil production to meet demand; 
Æ    no political obstruction from regional governments; 
Æ    no major acts of terrorism in the US or Europe; 
Æ    civil unrest is absent in post conflict Iraq and 
Æ    no significant damage to oil production facilities in Iraq 
or elsewhere. 
 
 
Intermediate  Scenario (30-40 per cent probability 
and conflict of 7 to 12 weeks) 
Æ    stiffer military resistance in Iraq; 
Æ    serious urban conflict in some areas; 
Æ    moderate civilian deaths but significant collateral 
damage associated with negative press coverage; 
Æ    limited or ineffective use of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion (WMD); 
Æ    oil production and exports increase only slowly; 
Æ    Saudi Arabia only offers passive co-operation; 
Æ    Israeli intervention and increased political tension in 
the region; 
Æ    major act of terrorism attempted in the US or Europe 
but either ineffective or prevented; 
Æ    significant civil unrest after hostilities cease and 
Æ    limited but significant damage to oil production 
facilities in Iraq or elsewhere. 
 
 
Worst Scenario (5-10 per cent probability and 
conflict of 13 to 26 weeks) 
Æ    protracted military resistance in Iraq; 
Æ    intense urban warfare in most areas; 
Æ    substantial civilian deaths and severe collateral 
damage; 
Æ    major US and UK casualties resulting in significant 
political problems for the US and the UK; 
Æ    US loses support at the UN; 
Æ    Iraq successively attacks Allied bases or cities in 
Turkey/ Kuwait or ships in the Gulf; 
Æ    successful use of WMD on either US/UK troops or 
Israel both triggering a major response with significant 
lethal effects; 
Æ    oil production and exports are not meeting demand; 
Æ    Saudi Arabia, Turkey or another key ally drops out of 
the coalition; 
Æ    serious Israeli intervention and at least the threat of 
use of WMD; 
Æ    massive political unrest in the region; 
Æ    major acts of terrorism attempted in the US and Europe 
or on US/UK interests in the region; 
Æ    significant civil unrest after hostilities cease which the 
US cannot control; 
Æ    US or UN humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts are 
inadequate or inefficient; 
Æ    Iraq attacks oil production facilities in the region with 
WMD and there is severe damage; 
Æ    serious lingering and environmental effects from the 
damage to oil production facilities, collateral damage 
and infrastructure; 
Æ    Iraqi people are openly hostile to the US/UK and 
Æ    the US and the UK face years of broader Arab hostility. 
 
The factors in these scenarios are not exhaustive. Clearly 
the benign case appears to be ideal in terms of what would 
be best for the world economy. The allies would probably be 
pleased if this outcome was achieved. In the intermediate 
scenario not all of the factors need to be present but a 
combination of any of these factors would move the conflict 
into this scenario. Time is not the critical issue here. If the 
conflict were protracted in terms of time but most of the 
factors of the benign case held then this would still be the 
best outcome. There is very little chance that all of the 
factors in the worst scenario will come about but a combi- 
nation of some of the more serious factors will lead to this 
outcome. For this reasons alone it cannot be discounted 
despite the low probability attached to it. Even once the 
conflict is over the uncertainties of what happens next will 
unfold and humanitarian, peacekeeping and re-building 
operations need to be considered. 
 
 
Oil price paths for these scenarios 
 
Benign scenario 
Æ    Iraq oil production is lost for three months; 
Æ    oil production resumes slowly in the second quarter 
and reaches 2 million barrels per day (mbpd); 
Æ    other OPEC countries make up for the lost output; 
Æ    US announces its intent to use the strategic petroleum 
reserve (SPR); 
Æ    no drawndown of the SPR is needed; 
Æ    there is only limited panic buying on the market; 
Æ    oil prices spike at the beginning of hostilities and 
Æ    continued high OPEC production and incremental non- 
OPEC production ease the oil price to the low $20s by 
the third quar ter. 
 
 
Intermediate scenario 
Æ    Iraq oil production is lost for six months; 
Æ    popular sentiment prevents Gulf Co-operation Council 
countries from increasing production; 
Æ    fears of oil shor tages result in stock building; 
Æ    US releases 1 mbpd of the SPR; 
Æ    OECD allies do likewise; 
Æ    global oil stocks remain tight throughout 2003 and 
Æ    lower global growth and hence demand for oil, higher 
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OPEC production and some easing in Middle East oil 
production cause prices to fall to an average of $30 in 
2004. 
 
 
Worst scenario 
Æ    most oil wells in Iraq are set on fire; 
Æ    Iraqi oil is off the market for the whole of 2003; 
Æ    acts of sabotage reduce oil exports in other Middle 
East oil producing countries; 
Æ    there is a discussion of the use of sale of oil as a 
political weapon against the US; 
Æ    there is major disruption to oil supply of 5 to 6 mbpd; 
Æ    there is a quick release of 2 mbpd of the SPR and 1 
mbpd from International Energy stocks; 
Æ    consumer hoarding further exacerbates the situation; 
Æ    oil prices spike to $80 per barrel in the first quar ter 
and 
Æ    the oil supply-demand situation improves over time but 
only slowly with prices falling to an average of $40 in 
2004. 
 
These scenarios were delivered in November 2002 at a 
time when stocks were relatively tight although a significant 
amount of supply from OPEC over production was on its way 
to oil consuming countries. Without a war the oil panel 
agreed that prices would probably fall from around $25 (at 
the time of the scenario planning) to the low $20s during 
2003. 
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